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counter these complex 21st century threats. When the other principal instruments of national power fail to protect national interests, our leaders may consider a range of possible military engagements with an assortment of missions, each requiring a different configuration of military force. When the diplomatic, economic, and law enforcement options prove ineffective in securing national interests, military power -strong, flexible, and rapidly deployable -is essential to the successful achievement of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). After analysis of our national interests, security strategy, and expected roles of the Army, the Army must continue its transformation efforts to a modular force.
It is often argued that the Army is more personnel "centric" than the Navy or Air Force, and is therefore more susceptible to external influences that could fundamentally affect its efforts to transform itself to meet requirements of our National Security Strategy. Culture constitutes one such key influence that will significantly impact the Army's ability to transform and sustain itself. This strategy research project (SRP) argues that the Army must address these cultural influences in order to maintain a force generation model that will ensure its role as a viable tool for the protection of our national interests.
National Interests in a Changing World
Identifying the national interests can be extremely difficult, but their identification is a critical initial step in developing an effective national security strategy. Fortunately for the Bush Administration, the fundamental national interests have not changed significantly over the last 20 years, reflecting the enduring values held by Americans.
3 "The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure" 4 is a vital interest that can never be compromised. Recently President Bush proclaimed that "America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one . . .
[that] every man and woman on this earth has rights, and dignity, and matchless value . . . [and that] we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave," 5 thereby identifying another important national interest of promoting self-governance. Promotion of free trade and free markets is also a vital interest as globalization has proven its "ability to lift whole societies out of poverty." 6 The 400% explosion of the global economy to $47 trillion since 1975 7 has fundamentally changed the interactions among nations and their citizens. All of these interests are bound together by the vital interest of democratic development, based on the recognition that "democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats and to encourage free and open trade and economic development -and less likely to wage war or abuse the rights of their people." 8 Although these national interests may not have changed over the last two decades, the global environment is constantly changing and requires a National Security Strategy capable of leveraging the various instruments of national power if the United States is to forge a new world order supportive of democratic development and free market trade.
This era is quite different from the Cold War past. Although the world was in danger of widespread destruction under the demonstrated capabilities of mutually assured destruction, the superpowers exhibited exceptional restraint in resolving disputes. 9 Threats posed by nationalist movements, ethic rivalries, religious extremism, terrorism, multi-national crime organizations, and information-age technologies are no longer subject to Cold War bi-polar control. 10 The
United Nations (UN) now faces increasing regional crises requiring peacemakers, peacekeepers, and humanitarian providers. The United States, the only remaining superpower, now finds itself deploying military forces throughout the world in an ever-increasing spectrum of 12 Carl Von Clausewitz, a noted military theorist, stressed that "every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions."
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In an increasingly interconnected global environment, U.S. strategy has a significant impact on our allies and developing countries. "The 20th century has taught us that security is indivisible. The safety, freedom and well-being of one people cannot be separated from the safety, freedom and well-being of all." 14 As the remaining superpower, the United States must develop the most effective strategy, avoiding the extremes of isolationism and superpower primacy. There are five "approaches" to consider for developing an appropriate NSS:
• Isolationism , the least ambitious strategy, has appealed to the populace in the past, especially during the early 20th century. 15 Its supporters assert that the United States is "not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, maintaining world order." 16 The Selective engagement will have succeeded if a favorable world order and U.S. economic prosperity are sustained over the long run.
• Primacy, the antithesis of isolationism, assumes "only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace." 30 As a grand strategy, primacy requires the uncontested supremacy of all forms of national power. Although the United States is the only remaining superpower with no near military competitor for the next few decades, economic power is bi-polar at best and steadily moving towards multi-polarity due to globalization. The United States recognizes the difficulty of seeking primacy and supports local and regional near-competitors by sharing economic, diplomatic, information, and financial power in an effort "to create a balance of power that favors human freedom." 31 Furthermore, while the United States has no near singular military competitor, coalitions could challenge the U.S. military primacy, and "shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank." 32 The United States has finite economic, diplomatic, and military resources and thus must continue to work with allies and governmental organizations to achieve its national interests. 33 It is unreasonable to postulate that the United States can instantly achieve all of its national interests in view of the limited capability and resources available to wield the various forms of national power.
A proper strategy, eloquently expressed in the 2002 National Security Strategy, recognizes that "coping with the new global disorder calls for a more versatile strategy that was required for waging the Cold War." 34 While such a strategy is based on selective engagement, it also recognizes some of the benefits of collective engagement. By working with allies and other governmental organizations, the United States can protect its national interests by taking a leadership role in promoting the expansion of "freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." 
Tailored Military Responses
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a "dramatic increase in regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, terrorist activities, weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking.
Regional instabilities . . . [have required the United States] to unilaterally, multilaterally, or within the United Nations framework, employ military forces in a variety of hostile and non-hostile circumstances." 42 In the current global environment, the United States is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones. 43 The humanitarian response. In both cases, the United States provided food, water, shelter, and medical assistance; the U.S. response relied on the U.S. military -naval, land, and air assets for the tsunami and air assets for the earthquake -without a significant force protection requirement. In both cases, coordination efforts either remained under the control of the host nations or were quickly turned over to the United Nations. As we are learning today, combat missions in rogue nations with a significant insurgency will require a large coalition of the willing during both the combat and nation-building phases.
While the initial combat operations might be short, building a representative government while fighting an insurgency could require commitment of a significant land force for more than a 
Transforming the Army for a New Era
Calling upon the full range of national power and alliances in an era far more complex than that of the Cold War to promote democracy, human rights, and globalization, 47 the current U.S. National Security Strategy of selective engagement is the most appropriate strategy for the coming decades. Specifically, the Army faces a significant transformation challenge as it adapts to the new range of likely intensive land component missions. The large divisions stationed in Europe and South Korea were designed for the Cold War and were not as rapidly deployable as smaller units, nor were they very adaptable or flexible during a time in which the number of operations other than war (OOTW) -peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief -exploded. 48 The Army of the future must be lethal, flexible, rapidly deployable, and able to conduct significant sustained operations. The new modular brigade combat team concept will allow the Army to provide a tailorable forward presence and rapidly deploy a fully operational unit appropriately sized for the proposed operation. "The Army intends to transform itself into a full spectrum force capable of demonstrating dominance at every point in the spectrum of operations." 49 The U.S. Army transformation to a Modular Force presents unique personnel challenges fundamentally different from the other three significant force structure changes since the end of the Vietnam War. Adoption of the all-volunteer force resulted in a significantly smaller Active Force, complemented by more robust Reserve and Guard Forces. 50 The build-up during President Reagan's administration presented recruiting challenges to man more ships, squadrons, and divisions required to defeat the Warsaw Pact. The subsequent fall of the Soviet Union, marking the end of the Cold War, resulted in a significantly smaller Active force -fewer ships, squadrons, and divisions -yet saw an increase in low-conflict operational requirements. 51 While all of these eras presented recruiting, retention, and planning challenges to ensure that the resulting Army force could meet ever-changing future mission requirements, the current Army transformation effort is fundamentally different, with more significant strategic implications:
Unlike previous force-sizing constructs, the new construct explicitly calls for the force to be sized for defending the homeland, forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct of smaller-scale contingency operations. As a result, the construct should better account for force requirements driven by forward presence and rotational issues.
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The Modular Force will be larger, more lethal, flexible, and rapidly deployable -the final product of a transformation from a "force designed for contingency operations in the post-cold War era to a force designed for continuous operations in a new era." 53 The Army will provide forces to theater commanders so they can rely on a unit rotational model much closer to the Navy model than the current practice of permanently stationing units overseas. The objective is to implement an Active Force rotation cycle that schedules brigades for a two-year training period followed by a one-year deployment availability period. For the Reserve and Guard Forces, the rotation cycle calls for a one-year deployment availability period following a four-or five-year training period. 54 As the Modular Force adapts to its rapidly deployable role, the duration and frequency of a unit's deployment from its home base is referred to as operations tempo (OPTEMPO) -the "rate of military actions and missions." 55 Since the GWOT expected to last more than a decade, and in view of the expanding missions for the military and the Army's transition from a forward-stationed force to a forward-deployed force, OPTEMPO is expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. The fielded Modular Force will "bear little physical or operational resemblance to today's Army" 59 and will have a profound effect on not only the military climate and culture, but also on the Army family culture. The future personnel assignment policies will improve family stability as Active Forces will be predictably able to remain in one location for longer periods of time.
But soldiers and families will encounter increased unit OPTEMPO as the Army completes its transition from a forward-stationed force to a forward-deployed force. Deployments may support major wars, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), regional conflicts, peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian actions, disaster relief, military exercises, and similar operations.
As the number of OOTW increased significantly during the 1990s, the Army endured a 100 percent increase in the percentage of the Army active duty enlisted force engaged in extended operations during a given month. In comparison, the Navy and Marine Corps -which already have a normal unit rotation cycle -experienced a significantly smaller increase. 60 Today, 155,000 of the 640,000 Active Force soldiers (24 percent) are deployed or forward-stationed in more than 120 countries. 61 The Army culture will evolve to reflect this increased OPTEMPO, and it is essential to understand its compatibility with the demands on soldiers' families.
Today's Army is made up mostly of families: Over 50 percent of first-term and 75 percent of second-term enlisted soldiers are married; 62 and the junior officer force consists of a "proportionally higher married population than ever before." 63 The Army funds a range of services to assist families while soldiers are deployed, acknowledging that families have a significant influence in career decisions. To determine the level of commitment to the Army and their families, a recent study found that 75 percent of soldiers (E7 and below) ranked their family as being the most important influence in their lives, but only 11 percent ranked the Army first.
Among the top two influences, 92 percent included their family while only 24 percent included the Army. 64 Furthermore, societal trends indicate that family emotional needs and expectations are increasing. Understanding these generational characteristics is crucial for identifying trends and forecasting future retention rates. The current generation of mid-grade soldiers -Xerswants more balance between work and family than the generation of senior soldiers -Baby
Boomers. Xers are less likely to sacrifice family relationships to satisfy workplace obligations. It is possible that their commitment to relationships stems from their upbringing: They have observed workaholic parents and noted the effects of single-parent homes. 65 Further complicating policy matters is the circumstance that a new generation of soldiers is being recruited and it is too early to understand how they approach the workplace. 66 Soldiers are increasingly forced to confront conflicting obligations between their families and the Army. Such situations "exceed the service member's ability to adequately meet expectations; they can create conflict between the demands of both, and ultimately force the service member to choose." 67 Fortunately, policy makers can consult several recent studies as they attempt to gain insight on the Army's key issue: "the impact of sustained, protracted conflict . . . on the Allvolunteer force." The RAND Corporation conducted a study on the effects of deployments on retention during the 1990s. Amid the explosion of OOTW, they found that infrequent short deployments actually increase retention of service members with less than 10 years of service. Deployments seemed to bring a sense of purpose; however, multiple deployments resulted in a lower retention rates when compared to undeployed soldiers, and multiple combat deployments decreased retention rates even more. 75 A related study by the Army Office of Economic and
Manpower Analysis found that when deployments exceed seven months, soldiers are less likely to reenlist, 76 a finding that seems to be intuitively supported by the RAND study, Navy experience, and more recent surveys. While the Navy and Marine Corps routinely deploy for six months, the Army is expecting to deploy units for twelve-month periods under the transformation plan. The Army currently deploys units for twelve-month periods to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Another recent media survey of more than 1,000 Army spouses living near deployment-stricken Army posts revealed that over 75 percent believed that "the Army is likely to encounter retention problems as soldiers and their families tire of the post-9/11 pace and leave the service." 77 Expectations of recurring twelve-month deployments for Army Active forces will put enormous strains on family relationships and produce detrimental effects on long-term retention.
These studies support emerging beliefs that increasing numbers of soldiers are leaving the military because they, and their families, are dissatisfied with military life, specifically the operations tempo that keeps them deployed in operational or training environments for extended periods. Soldiers are thus forced to make a choice between loyalty to the institution or to their family. In the end, the military loses with either the soldier "departing the Service or providing a lesser degree of commitment to mission accomplishment." 78 It is clear that leaders must "find ways to directly involve spouses in career decisions and discussions since these are joint decisions with both partners essentially having veto power. influencing retention decisions, strategic leaders can better scan the future when developing long-term force sustainment solutions. 82 There are a few options available to positively affect the growing percentage of soldiers citing "amount of time separated from family" as their primary reason for deciding to separate from the Army. While it is unreasonable to expect OPTEMPO to decline sufficiently in the coming era to satisfy family requirements, "the first step is to establish a metric and then work towards reducing it to acceptable levels." 83 Leaders must explore a range of options for the Active Force to adequately balance Army and family commitments:
Improve family stability, streamline field training, re-evaluate exercise requirements, review deployment requirements, establish equitable force generation deployment models, provide incentives for completing tours in the Modular Force, and increase opportunities for nondeployable assignments.
The transition to the Modular Force is designed to increase the assignment lengths at given locations and increase the predictability of deployments. Both benefits address some of the current issues affecting military spouses and dependents. Spouses are better able to pursue a career instead of switching jobs every 2-3 years, children are able to attend school with the same classmates longer, and the family can assume greater roles in local civic groups as soldiers are able to stay in the same unit for multiple tours or transfer to a similar unit at the same base. Furthermore, predictable deployment schedules will significantly reduce the family disruption associated with short-notice deployments. While these benefits will reduce family issues, they alone will not result in the retention rates required to sustain Army force rotation requirements.
Field training, exercises, and deployments not only affect unit readiness, they also result in frequent family separations. Often, the separations associated with this training are necessary to ensure units are capable of carrying out future missions. However, the Army must continuously assess and validate readiness requirements to ensure that resources are efficiently spent. 84 When it is determined that specific training activities no longer enhance unit readiness or that peacetime deployments can be shortened, the Army can reduce OPTEMPO to a more acceptable level, thereby supporting the soldiers' family commitments.
Twelve-month deployments are sometimes required to satisfy combatant commander requirements. However, opportunities will exist for units to deploy for shorter periods during their twelve-month availability period and striving to remain below the seven-month deployment threshold identified by the Army Office of Economic and Manpower analysis will lessen family stresses. Furthermore, eliminating back-to-back twelve-month deployments for specific units is an excellent way for Army leaders to make a positive impact on family separation issues with minimal effort.
Monetary and promotion incentives for completing tours in the Modular Force will be attractive to many soldiers and their families, while providing flexibility for families that may need a two year Support Force tour to address a transient family issue. The Navy currently successfully offers such incentives for Sailors to complete tours aboard ships: Sailors receive an incentive of $70-730 per month, depending on the number of years aboard ships, and they know that sea-duty is a requirement for being competitive at promotion boards. As the Army completes its transformation to the Modular Force, it is important to develop an incentive program sustainable over the long-term and embraced by the Army culture.
This last option of increasing the opportunity for non-deployable assignments is probably the most difficult. As the Army Active Force divests itself of many support related positions to civilians and contractors, the opportunity for soldiers to accept non-deployable tours is reduced.
In the end, the appropriate Active Force level must meet the Modular Force requirements, but as well provide Support Force billets critical to the development of both officer and enlisted leadership, while meeting any additional requirements to ensure adequate future retention levels. The Modular Force requirement relies on determining base requirements for the Active,
Reserve, and Guard Forces. Furthermore, determining which billets are critical to the development of senior leaders is more complex, since "the functional imperatives of the profession require that its commissioned leaders have the mental agility to recognize problems and then draw on a rich body of knowledge to formulate appropriate diagnoses and treatments." 85 The final estimate is probably the most elusive -determining the total number of Support Force billets required to maintain an acceptable deployment/garrison ratio 86 to achieve the required retention rate. If additional Support Force billets are required, then leaders must determine which billets provide and/or enhance competencies needed in the Modular Force.
While leaders cope with political and fiscal constraints, they must determine what is sustainable and then influence the political and fiscal environment accordingly.
Validating training requirements, reviewing deployment lengths, spreading out the deployment OPTEMPO throughout the Modular Force, providing incentives to serve in the Modular Force, and increasing the opportunity for non-deployable assignments are some options available to address the growing conflict between Army and family commitments.
Leaders must continuously scan the future to ensure that current policies are capable of sustaining the Modular Force into the coming decades.
Conclusion
The emergence of rogue nations, nationalistic sentiments of oppressed segments of countries, international criminal and terrorist organizations, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction all require a national security strategy capable guiding the vast national power of the United States and leveraging the national power of other states against the root causes of conflict and human suffering. "Patterns of conflict are changing in an era when nation states no longer have a monopoly over super violence. …Over the next 25 years, it is expected that the lines between lawlessness, crime, disorder, terrorism and war will become blurred, challenging governments to the limits in terms of managing and containing threats." 87 The current U.S.
National Security Strategy of selective engagement is an appropriate strategy for wielding the various sources of national power during the 21st century as governments continue to "undergo dramatic restructuring, accompanied by a wide array of economic, technical, societal, religious, cultural, and physical alterations." 88 Although military power is usually the last resort, it is essential that the Army carefully transform to the Modular Force concept.
As outlined in this SRP, the Modular Force will significantly change the Army's organizational culture. However, family and generational cultures also affect the ability of the Army to sustain the Modular Force. Our leaders must account for these cultural influences on soldiers' willingness to serve in the Modular Force. Failure to completely account for cultural issues and make appropriate accommodations will manifest itself in the coming decades through unacceptable retention levels of mid-and senior-grade personnel, recruiting shortfalls of married personnel, and a decline in the overall quality of experience and education of senior leaders. The results of lower retention and an eroded Army profession will make it impossible to sustain the force projection capabilities touted by transformation leaders. Although leaders tend to "reduce much of the Army's transformation to its technological dimension," 89 Resulting improvement in family harmony will increase retention, soldier productability, and
Army force projection capabilities. 
